Control Patterns in a Health Care Network by Kartseva, Vera et al.
Control Patterns in a Health Care Network
Vera Kartseva1, Joris Hulstijn1, Jaap Gordijn2 and Yao-Hua Tan1
1 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam
{ vkartseva, jhulstijn, ytan}@feweb.vu.nl
2 Faculty of Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
de Boelelaan 1081a 1081 HV Amsterdam
gordijn@few@vu.nl
Abstract. In this paper we present control patterns for the analysis and design of
administrative control mechanisms in a network organization. A control pattern
is a description of a generic and reusable control mechanism that solves a spe-
cific control problem, to be selected on the basis of the context. To represent the
context and solution, we analyze a network organization as a set of actors who
transfer objects of economic value. The usefulness and adequacy of the control
patterns is demonstrated by a case study of the governance and control mech-
anisms of the Dutch public health insurance network for exceptional medical
expenses (AWBZ).
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1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems are computer systems which are composed of a number of au-
tonomous agents, i.e., pieces of software, interacting to achieve the global systems ob-
jectives. Applications can for example be found in transport logistics [9], manufacturing
scheduling [38], and social simulation [35]. Increasingly, developers of multi-agent sys-
tems have turned to concepts from the social sciences like organization structures and
norms, as a guideline for design, e.g. [48][29]. Because of the desired global system
objective, the autonomy of the individual agents must generally be restricted: the de-
cisions of agents should be bound by rules, regulations and norms. Especially in an
open environment, in which heterogeneous agents may freely enter, leave and interact,
a multi-agent system becomes a normative multi-agent system [13]. Normative multi-
agent systems are
“sets of agents (human or artificial) whose interactions can fruitfully be re-
garded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should
and should not behave. [...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility
that actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of
obligations, or of agents rights, may occur” [23].
Generally, there are two good reasons to employ multi-agent systems: (1) as a
paradigm for software engineering, or (2) as a conceptual tool for understanding hu-
man societies [47, p.7]. In the first case, multi-agent techniques are applied, because the
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solution to some automation problem is inherently distributed. This is for example the
case in manufacturing scheduling [38]. A centralized solution, as in operations research,
would be possible, but would be less robust, and sometimes less effective or efficient.
In the second case, multi-agent techniques are applied, because the application problem
is inherently distributed, and a centralized solution is not feasible or legally possible.
Consider for example a work-flow system for criminal investigations, in which parties
with different legal rights (prosecution, defense, forensic expert), must or may not have
access to the documents at certain stages of the proceedings.
In this paper, we provide a case study of the second type of application: the health
care sector. We model a complex network organization in which autonomous entities
(government agencies, care providers, patients) collaborate to achieve a global objec-
tive. Although we do not strictly use the terminology and techniques of the multi-agent
community – we use theories from management and accounting – we do believe that
this work is relevant to multi-agent systems community. First, because it provides a set
of control patterns, practical guidelines for the analysis and design of the implementa-
tion of norms and regulations in a network organization. Such control patterns may also
be of use in the design of normative multi-agent systems. Second, because it deploys
the notion of economic value from business modeling to motivate the regulations. The
use of economic value allows specification of the business model of a network organi-
zation, at a relatively high level of abstraction. But to understand these contributions,
we first have to explain the case study.
1.1 A Social Chart for Dementia Care
In the Netherlands, the health care sector is making a transition from a supply-driven
structure, in which health care providers (e.g. hospitals) decide what health care ser-
vices are delivered, towards a more demand-driven structure, in which the patient can
select health care services (e.g. treatment, physiotherapy, domestic care) from different
providers. Such a ‘market for health care’ requires that patients know enough about the
available services and providers to make an informed choice. Currently, patients gener-
ally perceive the health care on offer as fragmented, and not fitted to their needs [33].
Few information is available about the services offered by different care providers, and
about their quality of those services.
This research is carried out as part of the FRUX project [14]. Among other things, the
project develops a dynamic interactive social chart for dementia care (DEMDISC): an
interactive web-site that will provide an overview of the health care services available
in a region, and provide personalized advice about possible combinations of health care
services, so called service bundles. The Social Chart is designed for the relatives and
informal care givers of patients with Alzheimer’s disease (dementia). One of the aims is
to develop a generic method for generating bundles of services, tailored to the specific
needs of a user [2].
1.2 Control Patterns and Value Modeling
Our role in the project is to model the governance and control aspects of a complex
information service like the Social Chart. Before starting a software requirements engi-
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neering process, it is crucial to get an understanding of the business model that underlies
the health care network. The health care sector is highly regulated. Moreover, the reg-
ulations that govern the health care system are subject to change. Because changes are
the outcome of a political process with many stake holders, the way they develop can
remain unclear. Moreover, when health care regulations change, the business opportu-
nities for a system like the Social Chart may well change too. For these reasons it is
important to develop a generic method for analyzing and developing governance and
control aspects, and for discovering corresponding business opportunities. Important
elements of such a method are
(i) a representation language and graphical modeling tool for the analysis and redesign
of control procedures, based on accounting principles,
(ii) a set of general guidelines to assist in analyzing and redesigning control procedures,
(iii) a library of generic control mechanisms, that have been validated and can serve as
’best practices’.
Regarding (i), the e3-control methodology provides a representation language and graph-
ical modeling tool [21]. The e3-control methodology is based on the e3-value ontology,
which analyzes network organizations in terms of the transfer of economic value be-
tween participants [21]. The resulting model is called a value network. In this paper
we extend this work, and present a set of control patterns. A control pattern is a de-
scription of a generic and re-usable control mechanism that solves a control problem,
to be selected on the basis of the context of application. A control problem is an identi-
fiable risk for opportunistic action by one of the other network participants. So control
patterns combine guidelines (ii), with best practices (iii). Control patterns are inspired
by the design patterns approach, which was proposed in architecture [1] and is now
very successful in software engineering. More recently, it has also been applied in the
business domain, to administrative processes [36], organizational structures [11], and
business process re-engineering [4].
The usefulness and adequacy of control patterns is validated on a case study of the
value network for the Dutch public health insurance system AWBZ (Exceptional Med-
ical Expenses Act). The governance and control aspects of this system are interesting,
because it is funded by taxes, and lacks direct feedback on the quality of services. The
system is undergoing changes, one of which is the introduction of a personal budget.
This facilitates the development of a kind of market for care providers. Although an
analysis approach based on economic value works well in commercial settings, one
could question its suitability for the public sector. We are therefore especially inter-
ested in the applicability of control patterns in a highly regulated value network, which
involves many public-private partnerships. See also [26].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a defi-
nition, and our library of control patterns, explaining the underlying control theory. In
Section 3 we apply the control patterns to the case study, reverse engineering the way
in which the network may have developed.
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2 Control Patterns
A sustainable network organization needs mechanisms to govern and control the inter-
action among network participants. In most cases, interaction is encoded in contractual
arrangements, and implemented through procedures and regulations. But regulations
can be violated. In the context of control theory, a network organization is therefore
considered to be either in an ideal situation, in which no opportunistic behavior in the
form of violations, errors, or fraud will occur, or in a sub-ideal situation, in which viola-
tions, errors, or fraud do occur. The terminology ideal – sub-ideal is taken from deontic
logic [34]. The ideal situation is in some sense normative or obliged, or (alternatively)
desired by the dominant actor in the network. Sub-ideal situations can be prevented, de-
tected or corrected by administrative measures called control mechanisms. An example
of a control mechanism is the three-way verification by the accounting department of a
payment for a purchase, against the invoice and the inventory.
In the accounting literature, control mechanisms are typically analyzed from an
operational or procedural perspective, with process models and flow charts [43][39]. In
a network organization, however, the ideal situation is often determined by the business
model of the network. Therefore, we need a form of business modeling, to analyze the
reasons for implementing a control mechanism.
2.1 Business Modeling
There are several methodologies that address the design of business models for net-
work organizations, like the Business Modelling Ontology [37], value webs [45], and
e3-value [21]. Of these, e3-value is the only one with a formal semantics, and a spe-
cific focus on value transfers between enterprizes. The method is ontologically well-
founded, and is supported by graphical modeling tools. We therefore apply the e3-value
ontology [21] for the description of so called ideal models, which express organizations
that behave in compliance with the procedures and regulations. Sub-ideal models are
expressed using e3-control, a modification of the e3-value ontology, used to describe
opportunistic behavior of actors [21].
Ideal Value Models An e3-value model provides a conceptual model of the value trans-
fers in a business network, encoded in the e3-value ontology [21]. The e3-value con-
structs have a graphical notation. Figure 1(a) shows an example of a buyer who obtains
goods from a seller and offers a payment in return. According to the law, the seller
is obliged to pay value-added tax (VAT). This can be conceptualized by the following
e3-value constructs (in bold).
Actors, such as the buyer, seller, and the tax office are economically independent
entities. Actors transfer value objects (payment, goods, VAT) by means of value trans-
fers. For each value object, some actor should be willing to pay, which is shown by a
value interface. A value interface models the principle of economic reciprocity: actors
are only willing to transfer a value object, in return for some other value object. So
only if you pay, can you obtain the goods and vice versa. A value interface consists of
value ports, to represent that value objects are offered to and requested from the actor’s
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Fig. 1. Example of an e3-value model of a purchase
environment. Actors may have a consumer need, which, following a path of depen-
dencies will result in the transfer of value objects. Transfers are either dependent on
other transfers, or lead to a boundary element. The e3-value methodology also allows
the designer to assign monetary values to value transfers in a spreadsheet and calculate
profitability of actors in a network.
Sub-Ideal Value Models In e3-value it is assumed that actors behave in an ideal way,
meaning that all value transfers occur as prescribed. This implies, among other things,
that actors respect the principle of economic reciprocity. But in reality, actors may
commit fraud or make unintentional errors, e.g. actors will not pay, or not obtain the
right goods. In e3-control such sub-ideal value transfers are graphically represented by
dashed arrows [21]. For example, Figure 1(b) shows a sub-ideal situation in which the
seller does not pay VAT.
Process Models Value models consider the transfer of value objects, like money, goods
or services. This is essentially the transfer of ownership rights [25]. But such transfer
requires operational activities to be performed, by multiple actors, which can only be
shown using a process model. Moreover, in value models the temporal order in which
objects are transferred is abstracted over: it only represents that objects are transferred,
but not in which order. The order in which activities take place, forms a crucial part
of many control mechanisms. So in addition to value models we need process models
to capture control aspects. We represent process aspects of control problems and their
solutions by UML-activity diagrams [40].
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Information Models Evidence documents, like receipts or tickets, form an important
part of the administrative control mechanisms studied in this paper. Nowadays, docu-
ments are often certified files in a distributed information system, of which the paper
document is only a trace. For an analysis of the structure and content of documents,
UML class diagrams are a suitable representation format. Other issues are related to the
management of information. Which party should store the documents? How is privacy,
accuracy and reliability of the data preserved? For such issues, see Ronmey and Stein-
bart [39, ch8]. In this paper, we focus only on the procedural role of documents in a
control mechanism.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The control patterns proposed later in this section, are based on a combination of agency
theory, control theory and ideas about trust.
Agency Theory A well known theory in sociology and management accounting is
agency theory, also called principal-agent theory. See Eisenhardt [16] for a survey.
Agency theory studies the relationship between two parties: the principal, who dele-
gates some activity, and the agent, to whom the activity is delegated. The theory argues
that if (1) the principal and the agent are utility maximizers with bounded rationality
and (2) there is information asymmetry in favor of the agent, the agent may behave
opportunistically. Agency theory distinguishes two types of opportunistic behavior.
The first type is caused by hidden information: the principal can not be sure that the
agent accurately presents his ability to do the work. For example, a producer (agent)
generally has better information about the product he is producing, than someone who
wants to buy the product (principal). The generally accepted control mechanism against
hidden information is screening [28]: the principal collects information about the relia-
bility of the agent, before agreeing on a transaction.
The second type is caused by hidden action: the principal can not be sure whether
the agent did his work according to the contract or not. For example, the producer may
use low quality components to produce a product. As a result, the quality of the product
is lower than agreed in the contract. The generally accepted control mechanisms against
hidden action are monitoring the agent, the and creation of incentives to motivate the
agent not to behave opportunistically [16].
Control Theory Control problems are typically identified by an analysis of risk indi-
cators and threats discovered in an audit process. A control mechanism prescribes how
to organize business processes in order to prevent, detect or reduce the risks posed by
a control problem. Internal control theory is concerned with administrative and organi-
zational measures inside an organization [43]. But in inter-organizational settings, risks
related to the behavior of partners in a network, are mostly dealt with by contractual ar-
rangements. So it is difficult to apply internal control guidelines directly. We also used
the more formal work of Chen [10] and Bons et al. [8][7] on inter-organizational trade
procedures. Chen concentrates on detective controls, as they are applied in purchasing
and procurement. Bons et al also deal with forms of preventative control.
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The distinction between detective and preventative control can be made clear by
the well-known example of the Paris metro [18]. In many countries, the norm that one
should not board a train without a ticket, is implemented by random checks. This is a
form of detective control; it assumes that there are enough incentives for a passenger
to avoid violation, given that the chance of being caught and the (social) sanction are
large enough. By contrast, the Paris metro has an elaborate system of automatic gates,
which makes it physically impossible to board a train without a ticket. This is a form of
preventative control. In practice, the two types of control are often combined.
Trust A network organization can be interpreted as a number of binary value trans-
actions between actors. When parties in a network do not have an existing business
relationship, lack of trust is likely. Trust has been defined as
“The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that
other party”[32, p.712].
Without prior trust, the party who invests in a transaction, called the trustor, is uncertain
whether the other party, the trustee, will perform its part of the deal or will defect and
behave opportunistically. The uncertainty of the trustor about possible opportunistic
behavior also comes out in Gambetta’s definition:
“Trust is the subjective probability by which an individual a expects that an-
other individual b performs a given action on which its welfare depends” [19].
However, trust does not have to depend on the trustor and trustee alone [44]. Institu-
tional control measures can be used to guarantee performance according to contract.
Legal provisions against fraud are an example of a detective kind of control mecha-
nism. An example of a preventative control mechanism for international trade, is an
Escrow service [22]. In such a scenario, the money of the buyer is deposited with a
trusted third party, called Escrow agent. Only when the Escrow agent confirms to the
seller that the money has been deposited, the goods are shipped. This solves the risk
of the seller, that the buyer will or cannot pay. Only when the buyer has confirmed
to the Escrow agent, that the goods have been delivered as agreed, the money is re-
leased and transferred to the seller, with a handsome fee subtracted. This solves the
risk of the buyer, that the seller will not deliver as agreed. So in general, the purpose
of inter-organizational control mechanisms is to reduce the uncertainty of the trustor,
and provide enough guarantees for both parties to engage in a transaction. If we model
the reasoning of the trustor, we get a kind of game theoretic reasoning, comparing a
scenario in which a control mechanism applies, with a scenario in which there are no
institutional control measures [5]. This kind of reasoning, about the risks of engaging
in a transaction, can be applied from the perspective of both the buyer and the seller.
It is not a coincidence that the effectiveness of an Escrow service has been shown
by game theoretic means [22]. The same kind of reasoning – using recursive models
of the expected behavior of agents according to other agents – can also be modeled by
the ‘qualitative’ game theory developed by Boella and Van der Torre [6]. Although we
do not explicitly use this kind of recursive modeling, it is implicit in the way control
patterns are to be applied.
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2.3 Conceptual Framework
The three components of the underlying theory, agency theory, control theory and trust,
can be combined. Based on this mixed background, we identify a vocabulary of terms
(in bold), to be used in the definition of control patterns.
Consider a transaction scenario, as shown in Figure 2. There are two agents, called
primary actor and counter actor. From a value perspective, we say that the primary
actor transfers a value object, called primary object, to the counter actor, and the
counter actor returns a value object called counter object. From a process perspective,
such a transaction is modeled by two operational activities: the primary actor performs
a primary activity, and the counter actor executes a counter activity, each resulting
in the corresponding value transfers3. Figure 2 shows a value model of such a transac-
tion on the left, and the corresponding process model on the right. The order in which
the primary activity and counter activity occur is not specified. This is indicated by the
UML notation for parallel execution (thick horizontal bar).
As in agency theory, in this scenario the primary actor has delegated some activity to
the counter actor. So we could say that primary actor = principal, and counter actor
= agent. The control risks of the transaction are generally assessed from the point of
view of the primary actor, who – by definition – does not trust the counter actor, and
must therefore design control mechanisms against possible sub-ideal behavior of the
counter actor. So we could also say that primary actor = trustor, and counter actor =
trustee.
Value Model Process Model
Fig. 2. Transaction Scenario, in which primary actor = principal = trustor, and counter
actor = agent = trustee.
Regarding detective control, we need to make some more distinctions. Detective
control [10] is generally concerned with verification: comparing the results of an op-
3 The primary-counter terminology is based on Bons [7], and is inspired by contract law, which
uses the phrases primary obligation, and counter party.
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erational activity with some claim about its legitimacy, quality or quantity. The claim
is represented by a document to-be-verified. One or more so called supporting docu-
ments represent evidence about the operational activity. The result of a verification is
usually a decision to perform some action or not, or else an evidence document stating
the decision. A template of a verification activity is shown in Figure 3. To simplify the
diagrams, in the remainder of the paper, we will only show the positive outcome of a
verification activity, since the negative outcome always leads to the end of the process.
One way of obtaining evidence about an activity, is by a witness activity. When parties
sign a contract, evidence of commitments is generated by confirm. For the transfer of a
value object, we use activities request and provide. When the value object is a fee, we
use the activity pay.
Fig. 3. Verification Activity
2.4 Pattern Definition
Control patterns are inspired by the use of design patterns in architecture [1] and soft-
ware engineering [20]. The idea is to capture the ‘best practices’ about the design of
buildings, software, and later also organizational structures [4][36], for different ap-
plications. Traditionally, a design pattern has four essential elements: pattern name,
problem, solution, and consequences [20, p.3]. We have transferred the idea of using
design patterns to the control domain. We separated the description of the context in
which a pattern is to be applied, from the problem which motivates the selection of
a pattern [11]. In our interpretation, the context describes the value network with the
actors, their relationships, like trust, and the activities to be controlled. The problem
specifies a risk to be detected or prevented by the solution of the pattern. The solution
describes the value network and the corresponding process model, after implementing
the control mechanism encoded in the pattern.
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Definition 1 (control pattern). A control pattern is a description of a generic and re-
usable control mechanism for a recurring control problem, selected on the basis of the
context. A control pattern consists of the following elements:
name: a descriptive name of the pattern, used to select patterns from a pattern library.
context: a description of the business network to be controlled, modeled from an ideal
perspective, meaning that no one behaves opportunistically. The context is repre-
sented by a value model, and if needed for understanding the context, also by a
process model.
problem: a statement of risks for opportunistic behavior. A control problem exists if
there is some deviation of the prescribed transfers of economic value. So we model
the problem by a sub-ideal value model, using sub-ideal value transfers. Again, if
needed, we also use a process model.
solution: description of a control mechanism, to detect, prevent or correct the control
problem.
The solution is described by both process models and value models. Table 1 contains
an overview of our library of reusable control patterns. They were elicited using the
PattCaR method [42]. Based on literature and case studies, we identified potential pat-
terns. These were modeled with e3-control and activity diagrams, and compared using
a commonality-variability analysis. The resulting patterns are validated in case studies,
one of which is presented here.
In addition we present some organizational design patterns listed in Table 2. Com-
pare for example [31][11]. We use delegation of an activity to some external actor. For
this pattern, we assume that the actor to whom the activity is delegated, is trusted by
the primary actor, so no additional control measures are required. Otherwise, the usual
control patterns apply. Decomposition of activities is typically used for efficiency. It is
also needed to separate an activity into two parts for control reasons, as for example
when a payment is made in two installments, one before and one after delivery (down
payment).
2.5 Library of Control Patterns
We will now present a library of reusable control patterns. We illustrate the patterns by
a simplified transaction scenario, in which a buyer (primary actor) has ordered some
goods, and does not trust the seller (counter actor) to deliver. So in this case the primary
activity is payment; the counter activity is delivery of the goods.
The Execution Monitoring pattern requires the primary actor to verify execution
of the counter activity, before executing the primary activity [10][7]. In previous ver-
sions of this research [27], the pattern was therefore called Pre-execution. It roughly
corresponds to the monitoring practice of agency theory [16]. The associated control
problem for the primary actor is that without the verification, the primary actor is not
certain whether the counter actor will execute the counter activity as agreed. In our ex-
ample, the buyer is not certain about delivery. So the buyer will only pay for the goods,
after having inspected that the right goods were delivered. When both actors apply this
pattern, we get into conflict, and an intermediate solution like a down-payment must be
applied [27].
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Name Control Problem Solution
Execution
Monitoring
primary actor is not certain whether
counter actor will execute the counter
activity as agreed
verify counter activity, before execut-
ing primary activity
Execution Con-
firmation
counter actor may deny that primary
activity was executed as agreed, and
refuse to execute counter activity, or
require compensation
require confirmation from counter ac-
tor that primary activity was executed
as agreed
Commitment
Confirmation
counter actor may deny to have made
a commitment to primary actor
require confirmation of commitment
from counter actor
Partner
Screening
counter actor may not be a reliable
partner to make commitments with be-
fore making any commitments
verify credentials of counter actor
Certification counter actor may not be reliable to
perform counter activities
require verification of past behavior of
counter actor
Table 1. Library of Control Patterns
Name Objective Solution
Delegation activity can not be effectively or effi-
ciently done
delegate activity to a specialized
trusted external actor
Decomposition activity can not be effectively or effi-
ciently done
decompose activity in parts, which can
be effectively or efficiently carried out
Table 2. Organizational Design patterns
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The Execution Confirmation pattern requires the counter actor to confirm that
the primary activity was performed as agreed [7]. Think of a receipt. The associated
control problem is that, in case of a dispute, the primary actor will not have independent
evidence to prove that the primary activity was executed as agreed. In our example, the
buyer will require a quittance from the seller, as evidence of payment.
The Commitment Confirmation requires the counter-actor to confirm, i.e. provide
documentary evidence, of the transaction commitment [7][46]. Normally, this is done
by signing a contract. The associated control problem is that otherwise the counter
actor may refuse to recognize that he made a commitment to the primary actor, and
may therefore not execute the counter activity. In our example, the buyer will require a
price quote or offer, which commits the seller to deliver at a certain price.
The Partner Screening pattern require the primary actor to collect evidence about
the past conduct of the counter actor, and verify whether the past record and reputation
of the counter actor conform to standards of trustworthiness, before making any com-
mitments [28]. The underlying control problem is the risk of making a commitment to
an unreliable partner. Often the research and verification are delegated to a specialized
party. In our example, the buyer can have an agency like the Chamber of Commerce
check the credentials of the seller, before making any commitments.
The Certification pattern establishes the authorization by the primary actor that the
counter actor meets the requirements to be allowed to perform a counter activity of
that type. This kind of regulatory control is can be implemented by different kinds of
evidence documents, like certificates, licenses or accreditations. Certification is needed
when the primary actor is at least partly responsible for the counter activity. The primary
actor can be a regulatory body, or an actor who has delegated the execution of the
counter activity to another actor. For example, companies offering Escrow services must
be licensed and accredited by the financial regulatory bodies of the country in which
they are based, such as the central bank.
In the Appendix, the patterns are summarized using the graphical notation discussed
above.
2.6 How to apply the Control Patterns?
Patterns can be applied using the three steps of the e3-control methodology [24]:
1. Define ideal value models
2. Identify control problems; model them in sub-ideal value models and sub-ideal
process models
3. Select a pattern to fit the control problem; (re-)design control mechanisms, using
the pattern.
To select a pattern from the patterns library, a control problem in a case description
must be matched with the control problem in one of the patterns. First sub-ideal value
and process models of the case are developed. Then, based on the value model, one can
identify the primary actor, counter actor and the sub-ideal value transfer. The primary
actor is the one who may expect sub-ideal behavior from the counter actor. After a
pattern that matches the problem description is found, the process model is adjusted
according to the pattern.
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3 Validation In Health care
In this section, we show how the control patterns can be applied to a health care net-
work. In particular, we focus on the fact that the case exemplifies a highly regulated
value network that involves many private-public partnerships. The case study is pre-
sented in two parts. The first part tries to explain, by means of the patterns, how the
current governance and control mechanisms may have developed. In the second part,
we study the control problems that arise from the introduction of a personal budget, and
show how the Social Chart could provide a solution. We discuss three possible future
scenarios for exploiting an information service like the Social Chart. The data for the
case study was collected by semi-structured interviews with five experts from different
health care organizations. The resulting e3-control models were verified by the experts.
In addition, we used publicly available policy documents, like [17], and government
regulations.
3.1 Reverse Engineering the AWBZ
In the Netherlands, the AWBZ4 deals with long-term and chronic diseases, such as
protracted illness, invalidity, learning disability, mental disorders and geriatric diseases.
Because this kind of care is too expensive to insure in a regular way, the system is
arranged as public health care. A patient only pays a small part of the costs; the largest
part of the costs is reimbursed to the care provider by a government fund, collected from
taxes.
Suppose we have a hypothetical health care system (Figure 4). There are two par-
ties: the patient and the care provider, for example a general practitioner. The patient
receives care in return for fees. The corresponding process model is relatively simple:
the patient pays only after receiving the care, according to the Execution Monitoring
pattern, applied from the perspective of the patient (Table 3). So there is direct quality
feedback. The task of paying the fees may be delegated to a trusted party, for example
the family of the patient.
Name Execution Monitoring
Context Patient (primary actor) receives care (counter object) from care provider (counter
actor) in return for fees (primary object).
Problem Patient is not certain if the care provider will provide care, as agreed.
Solution Patient must verify that care is provided, before paying the fees.
Table 3. Applying Execution Monitoring
Note that because of differences in expertise and status, the patient, or the family of
the patient, are often not in a position to verify the quality of the care. Patients tend to
trust care providers. Generally, care providers do not only provide care to get paid, but
also to help patients. So, applying accounting models and professional distrust seems
4 Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act)
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Value Model Process Model
Fig. 4. Hypothetical Care Transaction
inappropriate for many care situations. Nevertheless, it may help to understand the gov-
ernance and control of the health care system. This caveat applies throughout the rest
of the case.
In this hypothetical situation, there is a problem. Not all citizens fall ill, but those
who do, are faced with very high costs. For long-term and chronic diseases, these costs
can not even be carried by individual health insurance policies. Some kind of solidarity
is needed between healthy citizens and chronic patients, managed by the government
[15]. Such an exceptional health care system is shown in Figure 5. The solidarity is
shown by the fact that value transfers may be summed over a ‘stack’ of actors, for a
specific time period.
Fig. 5. Solidarity
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There are essentially two value transfers. The first one, on the left, is concerned
with access to health care. Citizens pay taxes, in return for the government funding care
providers. When citizens do fall ill and become patients, depicted on the right, they
can use the infrastructure. These possibilities are linked by a choice-fork (triangle). The
model is sustainable, as long as the income from the taxes of citizens is sufficient to
cover the average costs of providing care services (Σ taxes ≥ Σ budget).
This is not a valid e3-value model. First, the value transfer ’care’, is a single value
transfer. The reciprocal value transfer is made indirectly, through taxes. For this reason,
there is no direct feedback about the quality of the care provided, to the actor who
decides about funding. Such indirect dependencies are typical for the public sector.
Second, there is no reciprocal evidence, that the care requested by a patient, is actually
needed. In a regular insurance system, this would correspond to the verification that a
claim is eligible according to the insurance policy and conditions. Third, for the value
transfer ’budget’ no reciprocal evidence is required to ensure accountability of the care
provider. Moreover, in this model, funding of the care provider is not linked to the
number of care services offered. Typically, a yearly budget is set.
We first focus on the control problems of the care provider.
Control Problem 1a. A care provider receives a budget, without being held accountable
for the money. Control theory dictates, that every activity should be verified, with evi-
dence of its execution [10][43]. Here, that means that the two dependency paths should
be linked. On the basis of the control problem, that the care provider may receive a
budget (primary object), that stands in no relation to the care actually provided (counter
object), we therefore select the Execution Monitoring pattern (Table 4).
Name Execution Monitoring
Context Government (primary actor) pays budget (primary object), so that the care provider
(counter actor) may provide care to patients (counter object).
Problem Government is not certain if the budget is in proportion to the care provided to pa-
tients.
Solution Government must verify what care is provided, before paying the budget. The control
activities ’witness’ and ’verify’ are added, as well as ’supporting document’, namely
the evidence.
Table 4. Applying Execution Monitoring to Problem 1a
Control Problem 1b. All the costs of the care provider are reimbursed by the govern-
ment. Therefore, there is no incentive for care providers to try and work more efficiently.
Such an ’open-ended’ system is one of the general reasons behind the increase in health
care spending. Currently, there is much interest in budgeting schemes to reduce this
problem, for example by output budgeting. We interpret budget agreements between
government and care provider as a kind of mutual commitment, and select the Com-
mitment Confirmation pattern (Table 5). Before committing to a certain budget, the
government needs a commitment from the care provider that they can and will provide
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care for such a budget. In some cases the budget is calculated by standardized Care
Intensity Packages (ZZP).
Name Commitment Confirmation
Context Government (primary actor) pays budget (primary object), so that the care provider
(counter actor) may provide care to patients (counter object).
Problem Care provider may claim to have no commitment to provide care for a given budget,
and hence refuse to continue to provide care.
Solution Government only commits to a specific budget, if care provider makes a commitment
to provide the agreed care for that budget. Efficiency gains can be reinvested by the
care provider.
Table 5. Applying Commitment Confirmation to Problem 1b
The result of applying these two patterns is shown in Figure 6 (value network) and
Figure 7 (process model). The task of controlling the budgets of care providers, and ver-
ifying the evidence, is delegated to an independent local agency, called Administration
Office. For its administration task, the Administration Office receives a yearly budget
from the government. This budget is fixed; it does not depend on the amount of care
delivered by the care providers. By contrast, the budget of the care provider (1) depends
on the number of care services actually delivered (n).
Fig. 6. Output Budgeting and evidence (value model)
Control Problem 2a. Now we concentrate on the patient. Although every citizen is en-
titled to health care when needed, access should be restricted to patients whose care is
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Fig. 7. Output Budgeting and evidence (process model)
(medically) necessary. Again we frame this problem as an instance of execution mon-
itoring. The government or some government agency, must verify on the basis of evi-
dence, like medical tests or a diagnosis from a physician, to which kinds of exceptional
care the patient is entitled to.
Control Problem 2b. Initially, before March 2003, needs assessment was combined
with the task of allocating actual care. Both were carried out by Regional Indication
Centers (RIO). However, in some cases the needs assessments turned out to be inade-
quate: patients from different regions were given different products for the same diag-
nosis. These problems can be addressed by two applications of execution monitoring,
combined with the general accounting principle of standardization [43]. In the AWBZ,
care is categorized in standardized functions: domestic care, personal care, nursing,
supportive assistance, activating assistance, treatment and institutional care. For each
function, there are different classes, which specify the intensity of the treatment. Which
care needs correspond to which functions and classes, is laid down in the Care Entitle-
ment Regulation5 .
In addition, a patient needs to pay a personal contribution. The solution, which more
or less represents the current situation, is shown in Figure 8. Now there are two verifi-
cation steps (Table 6): In the first step, Evidence of Care Needs (Supporting Document)
is compared with the Care Entitlement Regulation (Document-to-be-verified). The re-
sult is modeled as a Right for Functions. This assessment is performed by a national
5 Besluit Zorgaanspraken AWBZ
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agency, called Central Indication Center (CIZ)6. In the second step, the local Adminis-
tration Offices translates the Right for Functions into an actual Right for Care. Because
the administration office has an overview of the available care providers in a region, this
actor is in a position to advice patients on where to get the best care they need.
Name Execution Monitoring
Context Government (primary actor) entitles all citizens (counter actor) to exceptional health
care (primary object).
Problem 2a. Government is not certain if the entitlement for care corresponds to actual care
needs of a patient, as detailed in the Care Entitlement Regulation
2b. Needs assessment must be uniform, but the available care supply depends on the
region.
Solution Step 1. based on evidence of care need, CIZ makes an assessment of the care needs
of a patient, and issues an evidence document: Right for Functions.
Step 2. The Administration Office translates the Right for Functions into Right for
Care, allocating care services and care providers.
Table 6. Applying Execution Monitoring to Problem 2a and 2b
Control problem 3. Until now, no actor in the network controls the quality of care
products. As a result, provisioning of care of low quality could remain undetected. In
the previous step, administrative evidence is used for budget control of care providers,
but no evidence of the quality of care is used.
However, a basic form of quality control does exist. The government is in a position
to select care providers. Before being allowed to enter the network in the first place,
the ability of care providers to provide the care functions for which they are known,
must be assessed. This accreditation is the result of applying the pattern Certification.
Accreditation is delegated to the Health care Insurance Board (CVZ)7. So in Figure 8,
the Administration Office can only assign patients to care providers who have an ac-
creditation from the CVZ. The CVZ cannot provide real quality control, but it based
on administrative evidence, it can at least ensure that the care provider has adequate
facilities.
3.2 Personal Budget and the Social Chart
The exceptional health are system described above has a number of problems. The right
for health are, through needs assessment, is disconnected from the care that is actually
available. For each care provider, the budget from the government has a limit. Care
providers do not have an incentive to provide services above their budget. Moreover,
this supply-driven system results in a fragmented and unbalanced care supply in some
regions. Therefore the government is moving towards a demand-driven system.
6 Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg (CIZ)
7 College van zorgverzekeringen (CVZ).
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Fig. 8. Current Exceptional Health care Network
Name Certification
Context Government (primary actor) provides budget (primary object) through Administra-
tion office, to care providers (counter actor), who in return provide care (counter
activity) for patients.
Problem Government is not certain if the quality of the care delivered corresponds to certain
basic quality standards and requirements.
Solution The basic abilities of the care provider are verified, The result is an accreditation.
Table 7. Applying Certification to Problem 3
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To try and solve these problems, the government introduced the possibility for pa-
tients to buy their own care services with a Personal Budget8. The personal budget is
allocated by the Administration Office on the basis of the Right for Functions. The Per-
sonal Budget can cover care from any of the following six functions: domestic care,
personal care, nursing, supportive assistance, activating assistance, and short term insti-
tutional care. The budget does not cover medical treatment, permanent institutional care
or medication. Furthermore, the rules for care providers are liberalized. A care provider
may now be any institution or private person. This liberalization has led to an enormous
growth in the number of care providers, which creates more choice for patients, and
in some cases allows them to regain control over their lives. We call these new care
providers alternative care providers. This situation is shown in Figure 9.
From a control perspective, we can observe the quality control problem again. Be-
cause of the large number of alternative care providers, there is no way that the CVZ
can accredit all of them. Therefore, alternative providers are generally not required to
have an accreditation from the CVZ.
Fig. 9. Personal Budget
8 Persoonsgebonden Budget (PGB)
Control Patterns 21
Control problem 4. Patients and relatives are not adequately informed about the avail-
able care, and care providers in a region. Only information about accredited care providers
is available from the Administration Office. Patients therefore tend to select traditional
care providers, rather than alternative care providers. This may stifle the development
of the market for alternative care providers. This observation corresponds to the general
idea that information asymmetry, a situation in which the customer has less informa-
tion about a product than the provider, has a negative effect on the emergence of new
markets [3]. In Figure 9, this control problem is represented by a sub-ideal exchange
(dashed line), labeled ‘care’.
Control problem 5. There is a risk that low quality care is delivered by alternative care
providers (dashed line for ‘care’). We can also see the problem from the government’s
point of view. If patients select care providers that provide inadequate quality, public
money is wasted. This is indicated by a dashed line for ‘Personal Budget’.
In an e-commerce setting, the first problem would typically be solved by an infor-
mation broker, who matches supply and demand. The second problem would be solved
by an agency verifying reliability. Since these activities require special expertise, it
makes sense to delegate them to a separate agent. To solve these problems, we must se-
lect a pattern from the pattern library. We dismissed the possibility of a regulatory body
assessing quality, because of the large number of alternative care providers. So the Cer-
tification pattern can not be used. Control problem 4 (lack of information) seems to be
related to the Partner Screening pattern. However, as it stands, the Partner Screening
pattern does not deal with the general information needed to collect a set of feasible
providers (see definition in Section 2.5). It only deals with the second half: reliability
assessment. Now we could adapt the patterns to accommodate this problem, but in this
validation test, we have chosen to keep the patterns as they are, and conclude that they
do not completely cover all aspects of the case study.
Although not generated by a pattern, we do have a possible solution. The infor-
mation problem can be solved by providing an information service, such as the Social
Chart introduced at the beginning of this paper. In Figure 10 this solution is represented.
Regarding problem 5, quality control is a general concern in Dutch health care.
Since 2004, an independent Health Inspectorate (not in the model) must supervise the
quality of institutional care providers. But this organization cannot feasibly control the
large number of alternative care providers. We therefore propose that an initiative like
the Social Chart should enable a kind of informal quality control. It could provide, for
example, a web-forum with testimonials, an online community peer review, a reputation
mechanism, or collaborative filtering techniques [41]. In this manner, knowledge about
the quality of care providers can be shared throughout the community of patients and
relatives. Community-based quality control only works when users contribute to the
community. That is why in the scenario shown in Figure 10, the Social Chart receives
Quality Assessment from (some) patients.
3.3 Exploitation of the Social Chart
Figure 10 presents only one of many possible exploitation scenarios. The Social Chart
could be set up for example by the patients’ association, by commercial parties like an
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Fig. 10. Possible Scenario for Social Chart
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insurance company or information broker, or by government. There are some indica-
tors that virtual communities of patients are able to provide a form of community-based
quality control [12]. There are already many successful virtual communities for patients
with a chronic disease. For example, Leimeister et al [30] discuss the characteristics of
a forum for cancer patients. Regarding dementia care, we find a relatively successful
virtual community, hosted by patients association ‘Alzheimer Nederland’. In the frame-
work of the National Dementia Programme, Alzheimer Nederland collaborates with
local government to improve dementia care [33]. So a combination of the patients’ or-
ganization and local government seems a viable option for setting up and exploiting a
kind of Social Chart.
Getting reliable online feedback is difficult [41]. Personal testimonials tend to be
biased. Luckily, also quantitative approaches exist. For example, a Dutch information
broker, independer.nl, is using a panel of general practitioners to get statistically valid
feedback on the quality of hospitals.
3.4 Discussion
The objective of the case study is to validate the use of the control patterns. In par-
ticular, we are interested in modeling a highly regulated setting, with public-private
partnerships.
Regarding the use of Control patterns Control patterns have a ‘constructive’ element,
but reconstruction can also be used for analytic purposes. In this case study, we applied
the control patterns to a hypothetical health care system based on solidarity. We have re-
engineered the administrative control mechanisms in the AWBZ. We have shown that
crucial aspects of the AWBZ controls can be motivated by the application of control
patterns. In particular, the evidence documents (needs assessment, evidence of ability to
provide care) are generated by application of the Execution Monitoring pattern. Quality
control is established by applying the Partner Screening pattern, or by applying the
Certification pattern when executed by a regulatory body. Budget control arrangements
can be seen as a kind of transaction, with mutual commitments laid down in a contract.
In addition, the delegation of tasks to separate agencies makes a large difference. So
although delegation is not a control pattern, it does play a role as an organizational
pattern. However, providing information about care providers and the care supply, the
first function of the Social Chart, could not be established as the result of a control
pattern.
In addition, the analysis demonstrates that there is a quality ’control gap’ for alter-
native care providers. We have indicated a particular solution to fill this control gap: an
interactive Social Chart, which could provide information about care supply and care
providers in region, and possibly provide community-based quality control. The use of
quality feedback to make a decision can be interpreted as application of the Partner
Screening pattern.
We have only highlighted some aspects, ignoring others. In particular, we have had
little to say about the information aspects of the administrative procedures. For this
case study, the control patterns are too much focused on processes and administrative
control, and too little on information and evidence.
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Regarding highly regulated environments The use of a value-based modeling technique
in a highly regulated setting raises some issues for discussion. For more on these issues
we refer to [26].
Indirect reciprocity In this case study, the economic reciprocal relation is often indi-
rect. This is modeled in e3-value by a broken dependency path (thin line). People
pay only for access to a service (triangle). In any insurance, the insurance premiums
(here from taxes) should cover the claims from patients.
Regulatory rights Public-private partnerships are heavily regulated. Regulation can
take the form of a system of legal rights, to restrict access to a service. Examples in
the case study are Right for Functions and Right for Care. Legal rights can be seen
as a value object in the e3-value ontology.
Evidence documents This case shows the need for various evidence documents. Al-
though collection and interpretation of evidence is usually modeled as part of the
regular business process, here evidence documents are seen as value objects.
Community-based reciprocity A community-based quality control, like a recommender
system, only works when members contribute Sharing and exchanging information,
like experiences about care providers, can be based on solidarity in a community.
Control services A control service like needs assessment can be seen as a separate ser-
vice, which can be delegated. This is highlighted in the model. All parties, including
government agencies, need to be funded
Regarding Multi-agent Systems Multi-agent systems are used when either the solution
to an automation problem, or the problem itself is inherently distributed. In this paper
we discuss a case study of the second kind. Although the AWBZ health care system
used to be centralized, with a large influence for the government (Ministry of Health),
the case study illustrates the development towards a more distributed structure. Semi-
independent government agencies like the CIZ or the Administration Office, have taken
over government tasks regarding access control the the AWBZ. In particular the intro-
duction of the Personal Budget and the acceptance of alternative care providers show
that the health care network is becoming more and more ‘open’. For alternative care
providers accreditation before being allowed to enter the network is no longer compul-
sory. On the other hand, quality control and information provision have become more
important, now that access is no longer restricted to traditional care providers.
4 Conclusions
The health care sector is subject to a constant revision. In general, it is much harder
to set up and maintain an information service, when the context is subject to change.
When regulations change, the business opportunities may well change too. Therefore a
generic method for analyzing and developing governance and control mechanisms for
network organizations is needed. Control patterns provide such a method.
A control pattern is a description of a generic and re-usable control mechanism for a
recurring control problem, to be selected on the basis of the context of application. Like
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design patterns, control patterns capture ‘best practices’ in a domain. Based on account-
ing literature and various case studies, we have developed a representation language for
expressing control patterns, and a library of generic control patterns.
In this paper we have validated the control patterns, on a case study in health care.
We have reconstructed the development of the governance and control mechanisms of
the AWBZ system for provision of exceptional care. The case study shows that crucial
aspects of the administrative controls can be motivated by the control patterns. In par-
ticular, evidence documents, like the needs assessment are generated by the Execution
Monitoring pattern. Quality control can be established by partner screening or certifi-
cation. Budget control arrangements can be seen as the application of the Commitment
Confirmation pattern, just like in business contexts. So the control patterns have proved
to be useful and adequate in analyzing this case study.
However, there are also some limitations. The patterns focus on process aspects
and administrative controls. Much less attention is paid to information and evidence
collection. This is unfortunate for this case study, because information provision is one
of the main functions of the Social Chart. Management information issues have not
been studied in this paper.
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Appendix: Control Pattern Library
Execution Monitoring
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 8. Execution Monitoring
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Execution Confirmation
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 9. Execution Confirmation
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Commitment Confirmation
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 10. Commitment Confirmation
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Partner Screening
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 11. Partner Screening
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Certification
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 12. Certification
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Delegation (Organizational Design Pattern)
Context
Problem
Solution
Table 13. Delegation (Organizational Design Pattern)
